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BOOK REVIEW: 
GETTING TO YES -- Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In 
By Roger Fisher and William Ury 
Houghton Mifflin Company 
Boston, Massachusetts 1981 
Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation 
Project have produced an easy-to-read handbook for negotia-
tion that implements the social science of interpersonal 
communication. Getting to Yes1 provides a method of con-
flict resolution that can be applied to all settings. Their 
negotiation approaches can be useful to attorneys and other 
professional negotiators as well as to lay-persons struggl-
ing with such daily problems as purchase/sales agreements. 
Its broad appeal as a tool for resolving conflict is created 
by detailing commonsense skills known to many but rarely 
presented in such an organized and readable form. This 
in-depth analysis of established methods of negotiation 
spawns innovative and promising approaches which may be 
particularly useful as a tool for furthering third world 
interests. 
In Getting to Yes, the standard negotiation approach of 
positional bargaining2 where each side advocates a stand, is -
replaced by the non-adversarial approach of "principled 
1FISHER AND URY. GETTING TO YES. NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT \iIVING 
IN (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fisher and Ury). 
2Id • at 3. 
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negotiation ll3 which provides for the decision of issues on 
their merits. Initially, the authors pinpoint specific 
weaknesses in the more traditional IIposi tional bargaining II 
model. 
The two prime components of any negotiation are the 
parties' substantive interests and the relationship between 
these parties. 4 Fisher and Ury argue that during positional 
bargaining these two elements tend to get lumped together as 
egos become involved in advocating substantive interests. 5 
The resulting ego protective posture so affects the visions 
of the parties that unfounded inferences about the other 
party's attitude, intent, and position are drawn from their 
comments. 6 These promote misunderstanding and inhibit the 
bargaining process. Separating the relationship from the 
substance of negotiation avoids such misunderstanding and 
the parties relationship is preserved. 7 
3Id . at 11. 
4Id . at 21. 
5The United States' interest in promoting the "Free enterprise" 
system has traditionally been a matter of national pride and identity. 
This "nationalism" is a major consideration in dictating foreign eco-
nomic policy. "The administration continues to give special attention 
to those regimes that most loudly proclaim their pro-American allegi-
cJ ance, regardless of their commitment to equitable development in their 
own countries." T. Ehrlich and C. Gwin, A Third World Strategy, 44 
FOREIGN POLICY 145 (Fall, 1981). 
6The adverse result of which the authors warn has been a "reactive" 
foreign policy in which American adversaries determine U.S. priori-
ties -- not clear calculations of U.S. interests in the Third World. 
Id. at 146. 
7FISHER and URY, supra note 1 at 21, 22. 
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The traditional model also limits the negotiator to 
hard or soft sell tactics where the intent is either to win 
at all costs or to avoid personal conflict. These methods 
are inefficient as they endanger the relationship between 
the parties and break down when negotiations involve more 
than two parties. 8 More importantly, they often lead to 
inequitable agreements since the result is largely dependent 
upon what the initial positions of the parties were. 
The Cancun summit of October 22 & 23, 1981 provides a 
useful framework in which to apply and contrast the posi-
tional bargaining and principled negotiation approaches. To 
ensure U. s. participation in the conference between devel-
oped and developing nations, it was agreed that there would 
be no formal agenda, no substantive negotiations and no 
final communique which summarized the results. 9 ,10 Although 
these terms demanded by the Reagan administration undermined 
the potential importance of the summit, they also created a 
neutral medium into which we can now introduce these nego-
tiation techniques and speculate objectively which would 
have been more effective as a means of reaching a true 
"global" agreement. The examples herein suggest the posi-
tional approach was least effective and led to a breakdown 
between summit delegates. 
8Id . at 7. 
9J. Lyles, Beyond Cancun, 98 CHRISTIAN CENTURY at 1149 (1981). 
10Souvenirs of Cancun, 145 AMERICAN at 273 (1981). 
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Consistent with the U. s. 's approach in past dialogues 
wi th the Third World conununi ty, 11 the administration pre-
dictably, maintained a "hard sell" campaign at Cancun. 12 In 
short, the U. s. position was that "[F] ree enterprise can 
best solve the problems of the poor nations .... ,,13 Fifteen 
developing countries were represented at the Cancun sufumit. 14 
The dialogue broke down where several parties were involved, 
bearing out Fisher's and Ury' s conclusions. This impasse 
also resulted from the Reagan Administration's hard sell 
tactic which proved simplistic (i. e., the free enterprise 
system alone can address the needs of the Third World coun-
tries). The Administration's bargaining approach failed to 
recognize the differing needs of developing versus under-
developed countries and the inability of the "free trade" 
policy to relieve poverty in underdeveloped countries lack-
.. . I 15 1ng 1n raw mater1a s. 
"For middle-income countries, much can be done through 
trade and investment policies, programs and resource trans-
llInternational Meeting on Cooperation and Development: Remarks of Rea-
~, 17 Weekly Compilation of President Documents at 1189, 1191 (Nov. 2, 
1981). 
12Yalowitz, Third World: Uncle Sam's Tough New Stand, 91 U.S. NEW AND 
;C WORLD REPORT at 20 (Oct. 26, 1981). 
13 Souvenirs of Cancun, 145 AMERICAN at 273, 274 (Nov. 7, 1981). 
14In attendance: Developed nations Austria, Britain, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, United States; Developing nations --
Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Guyana, India, Ivory Coast, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
15 J. Lyles, Beyond Cancqn, 98 CHRISTIAN CENTURY at 1150 (Nov. 11, 
1981) . 
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fers ... [b]ut for poorer nations, increased development 
assistance on concessional terms is also needed." 16 
The United states' negotiating stance regarding in-
creased aid to developing countries is another instance 
where the use of positional bargaining created pitfalls 
which guaranteed the failure of the Cancun Summit as a means 
of attaining a step towards global agreement. 17 
"Principled negotiation ll avoids the pitfalls of posi-
tional bargaining through the application of four major 
approaches. First, the relationships between the parties -
their personalities and their egos, must be separated from 
the problem. Secondly, the negotiation must be separated 
from the problem and focus on the interests of the parties, 
not on their positions. Thirdly, a variety of possibilities 
must be considered before deciding what to do, giving care-
ful attention to inventing options which will provide for 
mutual gain. Lastly, the result must be based on some 
objective standard. 18 
It comes as no surprise that effective principled 
negotiation is best accomplished by understanding the other 
parties' frame of reference. Thus far the authors have told 
16T. Ehrlich & C. Gwin, A Third World Strategy, 44 FOREIGN POLICY at 
151 (Fall, 1981). 
17Such governmental assistance by the U.S. has decreased within the 
last decade. The United States now ranks fifteenth out of the seventeen 
developed countries in terms of official assistance as a percentage of 
gross national product (GNP). Id. at 152. 
18 FISHER and URY, supra note 1 at 17, 41, 58, 84. 
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us nothing novel. What is unique is their advice that the 
negotiator avoid focusing on facts that confirm her prior 
perceptions; a good negotiator should not assume to know the 
other party's intentions. Such assumptions can work to the 
detriment of the relationship between the parties as well as 
lead to false conclusions. Instead the negotiators should 
discuss their differing perceptions explicitly, frankly and 
honestly. The aim is to lessen the threat to the parties 
egos by creating a climate of openness and understanding 
between them. In this way, cooperation in reaching a mutu-
ally beneficial resolution is established. 
Recognizing and understanding the participants' legiti-
mate concerns is central to prevent a merging of the rela-
tionship between the parties and the substantive problem. 
Recognizing the participants' legi timate concerns is 
accomplished by "focusing on interests, not posi tions . " 
Underlying interests, rather than a negotiator's posi tion 
will better define a particular problem; thus a thorough 
search for the interests of each of the parties is neces-
sary. From the pool of identified interests the negotiators 
then search for shared or compatible interests. Fisher and 
Ury assert that even behind opposed positions lie more 
shared or compatible interests than conflicting ones. 19 
When a variety of interests have been defined and 
options have been created these options should be presented 
19Id . at 43. 
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to other participants as purely suggestions, allowing for 
modifications while avoiding premature· judgment. In this 
way the negotiator can be concrete but flexible about her 
proposals. 20 
Fisher and Ury argue that this method allows the nego-
tiators to reach agreement without giving in. Where posi-
tional negotiation generally requires compromising one's 
position, principled negotiation entails sifting-through the 
factors that have formed each position in a search for com-
mon ground. That common ground in turn becomes a basis for 
a common agreement. Thus neither party has given into the 
other. 
Identifying common interests is the key to the success 
of this approach. But, the authors do not sufficiently 
address the possibility of few or no shared or compatible 
interests between negotiators, beyond stating that this may 
occur. Suppose the interests that are shared between two 
parties are minor points unrelated to the major concerns of 
the negotiators? Fisher and Ury would probably argue that 
agreement on minor points may allow for "trade offs" at some 
later time. 21 In any event, traditional "posi tional nego-
tiation" techniques are less likely to result in common 
ground than a method which focuses on identification of com-
mon interests. 
20Id . at 54. 
21 In the union negotiating setting, for example, the employer and 
employees may agree that contributions to employee's insurance will be 
paid by the employer. This agreement may be "traded off" to reach a 
resolution on the major issue of salary wages. 
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Invent Options for Mutual Gains 
Getting to Yes identifies four obstacles to inventing 
abundant options. The first is searching for the single 
answer. This pitfall prematurely bypasses better possibi-
lities. Another cause of the lack of good options is that 
the parties often view a solution as a win or lose si tua-
tion. The authors have termed this attitude lithe assumption 
of the fixed pie, II where less for you means more for me. 22 
Thirdly, realistic options or those acceptable to both 
parties are often ignored out of self-interest. Possibly 
the greatest obstacle is premature judgment, which hinders 
imagination and thus, the creative inventing of options. 
Avoidance of these major hindrances will depend upon 
the variety and creativity of each party's identified inter-
ests. Therefore, the negotiator must generate many options 
before selecting from among them. Invent first, decide 
later, look for shared interests and differing interests 
that may be dovetailed and seek to make the other party's 
decision easy. The opportunity to II dovetail II western and 
Third World interests presented itself in the context of the 
Cancun summi t. The developing nations expressed concern 
over the lack of technological/education exchanges with the 
Western world. The IIprincipled negotiation II approach could 
have resulted in a proposal for long term high level tech-
nical and academic training programs for students of devel-
22 FISHER and URY, supra note 1 at 61. 
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oping countries. This option would also address the U.S.'s 
interest in influencing foreign leaders and the development 
process. Additionally, the u.s. could alleviate the problem 
of the under-utilization of institutions that will result 
from the 25% decline in American eighteen year olds by the 
end of the decade. 23 
To confront the obstacles created by self-interested 
ignorance of realistic options the authors suggest molding 
the option so as to make the other party's decision easy. 
By providing the other party with the argument she'll need 
to persuade her clients or constituents the negotiator makes 
the choice as painless as possible. These arguments might 
include precedent set by the other party in a similar situa-
tion, e.g. past agreements, decisions or statements. Many 
important items manufactured by the Third World are legally 
excluded from the U. S. Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) which allows manufactured and agricultural products 
from developed and developing countries to enter the U. S . 
market duty free. Third World nations intended to use the 
precedent set by the establishment of GSP to argue for more 
equitable product coverage under that system. 24 The use of 
this past agreement may have made a favorable decision 
towards developing nations more palatable to the West; if 
negotiation had proceeded to this stage. 
23T. Ehrlich and C. Gwin, A Third World Strategy, 44 FOREIGN POLICY 
at 145, 159 (Fall, 1981). 
24Id . at 158. 
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Insist on Objective criteria 
The concept of "principled negotiation ll relies on the 
premise that negotiation results will be based on some 
objective standard. The authors contend that decisions 
resulting from positional negotiation where no objective 
criteria is taken into account, tend to be costly, arbitrary 
and unwise. 25 The outcome of positional negotiation can 
rely solely on "two human wills battling for dominance. II 
According to Fisher and Ury, the results of negotiation 
should be independent of will; objective criteria should be 
the standard for judging the fairness of a mutual decision. 
The authors assert that efficiency, scientific merit, prece-
dent, community practice and other standards of fairness are 
less vulnerable to attack, remorse or repudiation. Further, 
the participants contend with the merits of the problem 
rather than with themselves. 
The authors also provide guidelines for negotiating 
with objective criteria. They suggest that the negotiator 
frame the issue so as to inspire a joint search for objec-
tive criteria. Using standards proposed by the other party, 
when possible, is one means to this end. Alternatively if 
their suggested standard seems unacceptable the negotiator 
should consider having an objective third party decide which 
criteria are most fair. The negotiator should never yield 
to pressure, only principle. Where the other party refuses 
25 FISHER and URY, supra note 1 at 85. 
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to compromise the negotiator should first reevaluate her own 
position to see if some objective criteria which makes the 
other's position fair has been overlooked. If no principled 
basis can be found for accepting that position the negotia-
tor can attempt to shift the discussion from what the other 
side is willing to do to the question of how the matter 
should be decided. 
This approach of insisting on objective criteria was 
also applied at the Cancun summit. The fundamental position 
asserted by developing countries at the Cancun summit was 
that Third World nations should have an equal voice in the 
control of international economic institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 26 
These institutions follow a Hamiltonian system of propor-
tional representation based on wealth. Consequently, the 
western industrial world holds hegemony and veto power. 
Economic control over member Third World nations is thus 
maintained through this institutionalized standard. In this 
instance, the use by Third World countries of the western 
standard is ill advised. And no "third party" exists to 
objectively decide whether the proportional representation 
system is fair. In an effort to address this problem, 
summit co-hosts, Canadian Premier Pierre Trudeau and Mexican 
President Jose Lopez Portillo simply returned to the ques-
tion of how Third World development should be decided. They 
26 P. Lervoux, Can the Haves Meet the Have Nots Halfway? 233 NATION at 
403, 405 (Oct. 24, 1981). 
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obtained agreement to pursue development negotiations at the 
United Nations where each country had one vote, despite the 
U.S.'s demurrer on this consensus. 27 
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 
Roger and Ury suggest that the negotiator's best alter-
native to a negotiated agreement is the standard by which 
any proposed agreement should be measured. The negotiator's 
strength depends primarily on how attractive the option of 
not reaching an agreement is to each party. Consequently, 
the BATNA is essential to wise negotiation. The better the 
BATNA, the greater the negotiator's power. 
The BATNA is distinguished from a "bottom line" in 
positional negotiation. The authors concede that formu-
lating a "bottom line" may make it easier to resist the 
temptation of the moment to accept a less than equitable or 
unfavorable agreement. However, having a "bottom line" 
limi ts the negotiator's ability to benefit from what has 
been learned during negotiation, since a steadfast position 
has already been taken. Entering negotiations with a "bot-
tom line" reduces the incentive to create a tailor-made~ 
solution with mutual gain to both parties. In addition, a 
"bottom line" is often an arbitrarily chosen figure and is 
not an accurate measure of the parties' interests. 28 
On the other hand, a party's best alternative to a 
27Gaps and Links, 108 Commonwealth at 614 (Nov. 6, 1981). 
28 FISHER and DRY, supr~ note 1 at 103. 
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negotiated agreement is developed by inventing a list of 
actions the party might take if no agreement is reached. 
Promising alternatives that are discovered during the course 
of negotiation can become practical options from which the 
best can be chosen. Because a BATNA incorporates informa-
t10n elicited during negotiation, it reflects the merits of 
the problem better than a "bottom line." Consequently, it 
is more likely to also address the interests of the other 
party and is less likely to be arbitrary. For these reasons 
the BATNA is a viable al ternati ve to a "bottom li'ne." 
A BATNA would have been a preferable approach for 
Third World countries to take if dialogue had proceeded to 
this stage. Ideally, promising options would have been 
discussed by the parties and many concerns would have been 
addressed. Conversely, the western block may have beRefited 
more from sticking to its "bottom line" in light of its 
greater bargaining power and its hard sell position. The 
question then arises of whether an agreement could have been 
reached if the North used a positional bargaining approach 
while the South advocated principled negotiation techniques. 
Conclusion 
Although Getting to Yes may be criticized for its 
simplicity in legal circles, the authors did not intend to 
provide a technical negotiation manual for use by the pro-
fessional. Nonetheless, their primer does significantly 
increase the negotiator I s options. By dissecting the par-
ties I positions and scrutinizing these smaller interests 
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from different perspectives, many more options become appa-
rent. It is an approach that Roger Fisher has proposed in 
past works (e. g., in his discussion of issue control). 29 
Other negotiation experts have also alluded to the possi-
bility of utilizing conflicts in positions to derive criti-
cal interests from them, then creating previously unanti-
cipated alternative solutions. 30 ,31 
Most importantly, Fisher and Ury have challenged the 
conventional negotiating tactics of which most practitioners 
are well aware. Techniques such as outnumber the other 
side, arranging meetings on your own turf, and "locking 
yourself in" (bluff) have all been abandoned. 32 
Greater advantage can be obtained through the use of 
more rational rules or through negotiation which focuses on 
the merits. Most negotiators may be reluctant to play by 
these new rules. They utilize the concept of fairness, 
objective standards and principles. But according to Fisher 
and Ury it is precisely this use of equitable standards 
which makes the method difficult to disregard. The stronger 
the other side appears in terms of physical or economic 
29R. FISHER, FRACTIONATING CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND BEHA-
VIORAL SCIENCE: THE CRAIGVILLE PAPER (1964). 
30M. Deutsch, Conflicts: Productive and Destructive, Journal of 
Social Issues, p. 71-41 (1969). 
31R.E. WALTON and R.B. McKENSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF HALOR NEGO-
TIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM (1965). 
32Meltsner and ~chrag, Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, 
7 Clearinghouse Review p. 259-263 (Sept. 1973). 
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power, the more you benefit by negotiating on the merits. 33 
For these reasons the implementation of IInegotiations on the 
merits ll at Cancun would have greatly benefited the interests 
of Third World nations. But whether principled negotiation 
can be used effectively in a setting where the other parties 
insist on positional bargaining will most certainly be the 
factor determining its success. 
Another determinant will be whether it can be effective 
where the pool of identified interests provide no shared or 
compatible interests between the parties. The answer to 
these questions may determine whether Getting to Yes can 
replace the traditional IIposi tional ll method of negotiation 
and gain respect among professional negotiators. 
Ronaldo G. Cheek, Jr. 
33 FISHER and URY, supra note 1. 
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